

# A Military Encyclopedia

## Based on Operations in the Italian Campaigns, 1943-1945.

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### *Chapter Fourteen*

## **ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT**

### **Introduction**

Military Government of conquered, occupied or liberated territory as a distinct branch of our armed forces originated in this war. Planning and organization commenced in the United States and Great Britain and were continued in North Africa where applications on a limited scale were made in the field. When AFHQ [Allied Force Headquarters] was first set up it included a Civil Affairs Section (CAS) which later became the Military Government Section (MGS) and finally the G-5 Section of the Supreme Allied Commander's staff.

The first operation of AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories) as such, before the invasion of Sicily, was in Pantelleria under the direct command of AFHQ.

As the Italian Campaign developed, and changes occurred in the status of the Italian Government, modifications of the original organization were made to suit new conditions. From the beginning, however, AMG (Allied Military Government) groups in the field worked under dual control in that operational command and administrative control were exercised by two different authorities.

In October 1943, AFHQ had four separate organizations under its command: (1) a Military Mission to the Italian Government in Brindisi; (2) an administrative AMG Headquarters in Palermo; (3) an operational AMG Headquarters in 15th Army Group in Bari; and (4) an independent AMG in Sardinia. Fifth and Eighth Army AMG were under operational control of AMG 15th Army Group and under administrative control of AMG headquarters, Palermo.

During the winter campaign of 1943-44 these four higher headquarters were combined into one Allied Control commission. Two liaison officers remained on duty in the former 15th Army Group Headquarters, by this time known as headquarters Allied Central Mediterranean Force (ACMF) and later to become Allied Armies in Italy (AAI).

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Fifth and Eighth Army AMG came directly under administrative control of ACC, though operational control remained with ACMF.

By the end of the summer campaign of 1944, ACC had become a partly civilian Allied Commission (AC) permanently located in Rome. A new operational headquarters, itself under dual control, was set up first as the Civil Affairs Section, HQ AAI, and finally as the G-5 Section, HQ, 15th Army Group. The senior

officer of the G-5 Section 15th Army Group was AC of S [Assistant Chief of Staff] G-5, 15th Army Group. He was also DCCAO (Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer) under administrative control of AC. The AC had as its president a civilian diplomat [Harold Macmillan in Nov 44] and as its Chief Commissioner a senior officer who was CCAO (Chief Civil Affairs Officer) directly responsible to G-5 Section AFHQ. Fifth and Eighth Army AMG were under administrative control of AC and their operations were coordinated by AC of S, G-5, HQ, 15th Army Group.

All G-5 and AMG groups in the field were, of course, under command of the Commanding Generals of the organizations to which they belonged. AC of S, G-5 Section, HQ 15th Army Group advised the Commanding General and his staff on all AMG problems.

## ***Section 1. Organization and Planning***

### ***1. G-5 Section, 15th Army Group***

a. No operational AMG headquarters, distinct from AMG administrative headquarters, were provided for in the AMGOT planning which preceded the invasion of Sicily in July 1943. Through August and September, AMG Groups in the Armies were administered from the AMG headquarters in Palermo, the CCAO being represented at 15th Army Group headquarters by liaison officers. As Army AMG groups moved northward on the mainland of Italy, leaving AMG headquarters behind in Sicily, the need for a forward operational headquarters became apparent and the first 15th Army Group AMG HQ was set up in October 1943 with some 20 officers under command of the CCAO.

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ACC was activated in November 1943, but did not finally draw together into a unified headquarters until January 1944 at which time the battle line was static, headquarters of ACMF and ACC were adjacent, and the ACMF link was reduced once more to a liaison office. But in the summer and fall of 1944, as the Armies drew farther from Rome toward the Po Valley, lines of communication lengthened again. An attempt was made to solve this problem by frequent conferences, at intermediate points, between senior AMG and AC officers. Finally, however, to overcome difficulties of consultation a Civil Affairs Section was set up at HQ AAI which later became the G-5 Section of 15th Army Group.

b. G-5 Section, 15th Army Group was staffed by four permanent officer with three AC officers attached. The four G-5 officers were: (1) the AC of S, G-5, who was also DCCAO, (2) an Executive Officer, (3) the Chief of the Civil Affairs Division, and (4) the Chief of the Economics Division. The three attached officers were: (1) a forward representative of the Displaced Persons and Refugees Sub-Commission, AC, responsible to both the Chief of the Civil Affairs Division, G-5 Section, 15th Army Group and to the Sub-Commission at HQ AC, (2) the Deputy Director (Field) of the Public Relations Branch, AC, responsible to both the DCCAO and to the Branch at HQ AC, and (3) an Assistant to the DCCAO.

c. The Chief of the Civil Affairs Division was responsible for Displaced Persons and Repatriation; Education; Legal Affairs; Local Government; Monuments; Fine Arts and Archives; Patriots; Public Health; Public Safety; Italian Air, Land and Naval Forces Affairs; and War Materiels Disposal and

Prisoners of War. The Chief of the Economics Division was responsible for Agriculture; Commerce; Finance; Food; Industry; Labor; Public Works and Utilities; Shipping; Transportation and Communications.

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d. Of the four permanent officers of the G-5 Section, 15th Army Group, two (American) were carried on the Table of Organization (T/O) of 15th Army Group and two (British) on the War Establishment (W/E) of AC. Of the three attached officers, two (British) were carried on the WE of AC and one (American) on the T/O of 2675 Regiment.

## **2. AMG, Fifth Army**

a. While AMG was still in French Morocco, shortly after the cessation of hostilities with the French garrison, civil affairs were conducted by a Civil Affairs Section whose principal function was to insure that the interests of the Army were not prejudiced by the French Administration. In due course, the name was changed to Liaison Section, to correspond with the name of a similar section at AFHQ.

b. When Fifth Army was preparing to land at Salerno, the Liaison Section became the planning group for AMG Fifth Army, which soon took the form it maintained virtually unchanged until the end of the Italian campaign. The Senior Civil Affairs Officer (SCAO) later became also AC of S, G-5, Fifth Army. He exercised technical control over the Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs) of Corps and Divisions within the Fifth Army, and also exercised similar control over the Regional and Provincial Officers of the Allied Commission who functioned within Army territory.

c. To assist him in his functions he also had a Chief of Staff (finally designated as Executive Officer) and Operations and Administration Officers with assistants, in addition to a staff of specialists in Public Health, Public Safety, Justice, Finance, Economics, Industry, Supply, Education, Engineering, Agriculture, and Monuments and Fine Arts.

d. In each Corps of Fifth Army a similar though diminished structure obtained. The Corps SCAO had with him an executive officer and a small number of specialists. The size of the Corps Civil Affairs Section varied with the size of the Corps area. Divisions had one or two CAOs, according to need.

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e. The AC of S, G-5, was the advisor to the Army Commander in matters affecting the civilian population. The actual functions of Military Government were performed by AMG personnel attached to Corps and Divisions or organized into Regional or Provincial teams. When operations were in progress, Division CAOs took emergency action in the first instance to establish the elements of local government. Corps Civil Affairs personnel then carried the process of local government further, and at the earliest possible opportunity, under Army AMG supervision, requested the installation of Provincial teams. Provincial teams consisted of a Provincial Commissioner (PC) with assistants and technical advisors on law, finance and supply. These were the "permanent" Military Government of the Province, and when Corps

Officers moved on, they remained until Military Government ceased and the Provinces were turned over to the Italian Government.

f. There were some variations to meet local conditions. Certain large cities were found to present special problems with which the relatively small Provincial staffs could not deal. In such cases, City AMG teams were set up under specially qualified field officers. Organizations of this type operated in Naples, Rome, Florence, Leghorn, Bologna, and Verona.

### **3. AMG Eighth Army**

a. Planning fell naturally into two sections: (1) policy and economics on a long term basis and (2) operations. Though (1) is not dealt with here, it should be pointed out that the difficult localities often require modifications to an existing system and any such modification must be made known to the Military Government Branch of an Army in time to be put into effect before new territory is entered. Operational planning presented no difficulties in Eighth Army AMG because the intention of the Army Commander was always known in sufficient time before any operation commenced.

b. The main problems which faced Military Government in operational phases were (1) Supply, (2) Refugees, and (3) Civilian sick and wounded. Before any operational advance took place an appreciation of the situation was made as regarded the total requirements of civilian supplies which had to be lifted from dumps in the rear, broken down into daily maintenance requirements, and also stockpiled for forward advances.

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c. Whenever possible, forward stockpiling was accomplished by rail through ordinary Army channels, but failing the availability of rail transport, programs of stockpiling at predecided places were worked out. Such places had to be on Army lines of communication so that in the event of the Army being called upon to lift civilian supplies it could do so on its normal Line of Communication.

d. Dependent upon the degree of intensity of the operation, civil hospitals and refugee camps were cleared to enable wounded and sick refugees to be dealt with expeditiously and to avoid interference with or congestion on operational lines of communication. For this purpose sufficient Public Safety officers were made available.

e. The organization and chain of command of AMG Eighth Army conformed to and followed the usual channels obtained in the various military units under Army command. AMG formed an integral part of the Army Staff in the same way as the "A" and "Q" Branches did. It was split into two: one part with Main HQ and the other with Rear HQ, and both parts moved with and as part of the Main and Rear Headquarters. The branch at Main Army was kept to the minimum since it concerned itself only with policy and close personal contact with the forward units of Military Government situated with Corps and Divisions. The Branch at Main Army consisted of the Head of AMG Eighth Army (SCAO); a GSOI for operations and policy; and a Staff Captain for Military Secretary, Intelligence, etc. It was sometimes necessary to add an

officer to deal with AMG functions peculiar to the military operational picture, and requiring close personal contact with forward units.

f. At Rear Army HQ, AMG consisted of the specialist officers under command of an SOI. They included specialists in Public Safety, Health and Welfare, Supply, Finance, Refugees and Displaced Persons, Internal Administration, and Monuments and Fine Arts.

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Specialists in Engineering, Labor, Industry, Education and Legal Affairs were normally drawn on attachment from Regions in rear.

g. It was vitally important that all AMG officers at Rear Army work in the closest cooperation with their equivalent Branches of the Army: Public Safety with DPM and GSI (b), Medical with DDMS and Supply with DDST and "Q".

h. Each Corps had attached to it an AMG LO [Liaison Officer?] who in turn had under command an AMG LO with each Division. These officers lived and moved with the formations to which they were attached. They were under command of their respective formation commanders for "operation" but for administration they came under command of Army AMG. It was usually necessary for the Corps LO to have a small staff consisting of a Medical Officer, a Public Safety Officer and a Finance Officer, but numbers were kept down to the absolute minimum required to do the work. The function of Corps AMG was more operational than administrative. The Corps AMG LO was responsible for all operational moves of Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs) during the advance and for dealing with emergency administrative matters. He also saw that CAOs given him by Provinces and Regions coming up behind were put into their proper locations as decided by the Provincial Commissioners. He also maintained liaison with the PCs, whom he installed into their capitals as soon as these were liberated, at which time administrative control of all CAOs in the Province became the responsibility of the PC, guided on operational matters by the Corps LO.

i. The number of CAOs in any Corps or Divisional area depended on geographical conditions. Numbers were never fixed on an establishment for each formation. While Corps and Divisional AMG LOs moved with their Corps and Divisions, CAOs did not. They came under command as operations required.

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## ***Section 2. Training***

### ***1. Selection of Personnel***

a. Efforts were made to select officers of the highest integrity, because in AMG work opportunities for corruption and speculation abounded. Since wide areas had to be covered, energetic officers were required, and as they were confronted by so many varied problems they had to be industrious, painstaking and equipped with common sense and good judgement. Flexibility and imagination were also required. Patience was found to be a virtue if it was backed by determination. In many cases ends were best achieved by a sympathetic attitude based on human understanding, but nothing was accomplished

without firmness. Neither advancing years nor physical disability were found to be disqualifying liabilities in officers whose vigor and mental alertness had not declined. It was an advantage to have traveled, a sense of humor was often invaluable, and as AMG officers were left very much to themselves they needed mature consciences. Personality and leadership were often more valuable than efficiency and drive, as was common sense as opposed to cleverness, when coupled with an understanding of human nature. Gullibility was a dangerous handicap. Impartiality and fair-mindedness were both most necessary.

b. AMG officers fell into two distinct classes: (1) Specialists, and (2) Military Government officers. Complete mastery of their subject was the greatest asset of the specialist officers. They had to know their job at least as well as the opposite number in the occupied territory. A military background was preferable, but not essential provided they adapted themselves to military methods. They were, in fact, technicians with goods to deliver. For them affability and an understanding of human nature were not enough. In the Public Safety Branch, police training in civil life was essential, and in the Legal and Public Health branches a knowledge of law and medicine was equally necessary. Military Government officers had to have military background, and the best AMG officers were found to be the officers with the best military records.

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c. Different races require different treatments and the ideal would have been to select officers specifically to deal with particular nationals. Officers with previous experience in colonial administration, and possessing some military background, were generally successful. But highly trained civil servants, despite their knowledge of local government machinery, often so lacked adaptability as to be almost complete failures.

## **2. AMG Schools**

a. Instructors who were fully conversant with the practice as opposed to the theory of Military Government were found best. Instruction in theory was not ignored, and was used as a foundation, but instructors with experience were able to make it clear that practice often had to be at variance with theory. While specialist officers were able to instruct in their own subjects, their object was to let the Military Government officers know what they had to offer rather than attempt to convert them into specialists. Hard and fast rules of procedure did not work in the Italian campaign. The best instructors recognized that though it was found perfectly safe to lay down certain principles, few problems could be solved by rule of thumb.

b. It was found best to recount actual experiences, solutions applied to specific problems and the result obtained, good, bad, or indifferent. Instructors who attempted to convince students that they were infallible generally forfeited the respect of those students. The motif of the soundest instruction was the decisive importance of common sense and an understanding of human nature. Specialist subjects were most successfully introduced from the point of view of showing students how the machinery worked rather than teaching them to work it themselves. The Legal side was, however, an exception to this, since the Military Government officer himself had to administer the law.

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Mock trials were just as instructive as visits to actual courts. Valuable periods were those devoted to practical instruction, i.e., putting the student in the position of an AMG Officer and confronting him with type problems. Variety was found essential in AMG schools. Successions of lectures proved monotonous, and discussion and debates as well as practical demonstrations were used to break the monotony. It was found advisable to limit the hours of instruction and to let the students do as they liked in their free time.

### ***Section 3. Operations***

The organization and methods of operation of AMG behind Army boundaries were along AC [Allied Commission] rather than Army AMG lines, and therefore not germane to this article. It was found in practice, however, as the Italian campaign developed, that the interests of Army and Regional AMG overlapped, and in the winter of 1943-1944 [this should read 1944-45] an experiment in fusing Army and Regional AMG organizations in the forward Eighth Army area in Emilia Region was made, resulting in a highly successful joint operation under an organization summarized as follows:

a. The Military Government Branch of Eighth Army was to all intents and purposes united with the Regional AMG which would ultimately take over. In fact, there was never any sharply delineated "take over", but a continuity of cooperation from the outset.

b. Region was converted into the Administrative HQ of AMG and came under command of AMG while the territory of the Region was still being overrun. The Administrative HQ was set up in a convenient point in Army area, as near as possible to AMG HQ, Rear Army. If necessary, it could have moved forward as the Army advanced, but in practice it remained in its original location until the Regional capital was liberated. The Second-in-command of Regional HQ was given command of the SOI at AMG Rear Army.

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c. The Administrative HQ was charged with the whole administration of the Army area, with the following limitations: (1) all matters of policy were the responsibility of the SCAO [Senior Civil Affairs Officer] AMG, and (2) all matters involving contact with military formations were dealt with by AMG at Main or Rear Army HQ. The calling forward of civilian supplies through "Q" Branch was, for instance, done through this channel.

d. The Provincial Staffs and Communal Civil Affairs Officers of the Province were placed in position by Army AMG, and came under command of Administrative HQ acting on behalf of Army AMG.

### ***Section 4. Relations with Italian Government Territory***

There was, strictly speaking, no relationship between forward AMG organization and territory which had been turned back to the Italian Government by AC after the stage of Regional administration. But as the Italian campaign developed and the Italian Government consolidated itself in Rome, it was found increasingly difficult to persuade Italians in Army areas to accept the necessarily strict Army AMG

regulations. Radio programs and newspapers published in Italian territory found their way into AMG areas and the people did not always understand that decrees, laws and regulations in force in fully liberated parts of their country did not also apply to them at once. This was particularly true during the winter months of 1943-44 [again, from context, this should read 1944-45] when the line of battle was virtually static for a long period and when the large number of troops quartered in Army areas made conditions extremely difficult for the civilians. AMG personnel met the situation with a combination of tact and firmness which prevented any disorders. It was found necessary to exclude Italian politicians from the area. Exceptions were made only for the gravest reasons, and then only with special permission in each case of the Army SCAO concerned.

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## ***Section 5. Organization of Allied Commission***

a. The Allied Commission (AC) was the organization primarily responsible, under AFHQ [Allied Force Headquarters] command, for the administration of Allied Military Government in Italy.

b. Its headquarters were near or at the seat of the Italian Government and it exercised general administrative authority over all AMG elements in the Field. Operational AMG organizations in Army Group and Army areas have already been described. Immediately behind them, and often working with them, was another group of Commission organizations carrying on Military Government in Italy in that twilight period which followed the advance of the armed forces, but preceded the turning over of occupied territory to the Italian Government. These were the Regional administrative teams which governed areas corresponding to the Italian "Compartimenti". Each Regional HQ was organized, on a reduced scale, along the lines of AC HQ, and under Regional HQ were Provincial teams which operated in the Italian Provinces normally governed under Prefects.

c. Under the President and the Chief Commissioner of AC was a Chief of Staff. The Commission was divided into four main sections: Political, Civil Affairs, Economic, and Establishment. Each Section had a Vice-President and Deputy Chief of Staff (the Political Section had two joint Vice-Presidents, one American and one British). In addition to the four main sections were five independent sub-commissions: (1) Italian Air Force, (2) Italian Land Forces, (3) Italian Navy, (4) Communications, and (5) War Materials Disposal and Prisoners of War. There was also a Public Relations Branch, responsible directly to the Chief Commissioner. The remaining Sub-Commissions were grouped in the Civil Affairs Section and the Economic Section as follows:

In the Civil Affairs Sections: (1) Displaced Persons and Repatriation, (2) Education, (3) Legal Affairs, (4) Local Government, (5) Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives, (6) Patriots, (7) Public Health, (8) Public Safety.

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In the Economic Section: (1) Agriculture, (2) Commerce, (3) Finance, (4) Food, (5) Industry, (6) Labor, (7) Public Works and Utilities, (8) Shipping, (9) Transportation.

## ***Section 6. Personnel and Replacements***



Personnel and replacements in Army AMG organizations were supplied by AC through normal administrative channels. The experience gained in operations showed that, in the main, the officers sent forward by AC were good. Detailed observations will be found in paragraph 2 (Training).

## ***Section 7. Supplies and Transport***

a. The work of the Supplies Branch was the most important and difficult in AMG. On its effectiveness depended the successful operation of almost every other branch, Public Safety in particular. Supply Officers had to be experienced men capable of dealing with an enormous range of highly complex problems affecting the well-being of hundred of thousands of civilians.

b. Before the Sicilian and Italian invasions, Allied propaganda assured the civilian population more than an adequate food ration. AMG had therefore to meet a population whose expectations were high. However, owing to a world-wide shortage of shipping and to the high priority of the demands of the Armies it was never possible to import more than a minimum of requirements. The importance of using and distributing local resources, therefore, soon became obvious.

c. In principle the responsibility for food distribution and accounting was thrown on Italian officials, but in practice, particularly in the southern parts of the peninsula and in Sicily, The Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs) had to keep a sharp eye on supply matters. Nevertheless, the principle justified itself at later stages of the campaign.

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d. The head of the Supplies Branch was the Senior Supplies Officer at AMG Rear Army HQ. He planned his requirements ahead for the areas he had to feed. These requirements were communicated to the Food Sub-Commission at AC HQ where allocations were made to AMG from base depots in Naples, Bari, Ancona, Leghorn, and other ports. As the war went on, advance base depots were established and supplies brought to them by road, rail or sea transport. They were sited as far forward as was permitted by the road transport available to lift supplies from port or railhead. The lift from Base to army railhead was usually made through bids for tonnage through G-4 ("Q") at Rear Army HQ.

e. From advanced base depots, supplies were allocated by the Senior Supplies Officer to the Provincial Supplies Officers, usually for one month, on ration scales laid down by the Food Sub-Commission. Deliveries were made by WD transport to limited numbers of supply points selected by the PSO and issued by him to communes through Italian organizations. The last step was always complicated by shortage of transport, and for some time by the inefficiency of the Italian organizations and general popular distrust of them. In emergencies, such as occurred after the Cassino battle and the breaching of the Gothic Line, issues were made direct to communes from advanced supply depots. These emergency issues were a great factor in restoring civilian morale and in inspiring confidence in AMG.

f. Difficulties never overcome were (1) liaison with rear echelons, owing to slow and uncertain communication between operational areas and HQ AC, and (2) phasing in supplies from several

different places and combining them in a single week's program for a single army railhead. This problem was partly overcome by the sympathetic cooperation of other Army branches.

g. Eventually the Italian population came to expect the minimum rather than the maximum. This, coupled with the simple needs of most Italians and the fact that the Germans rarely got away with everything, enabled the Supplies Branch to avert starvation and even severe hardship.

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h. Civilian transport in the Army Area was at all times in short supply. Spare parts and tires scarcely existed. This problem was aggravated in the early days by the fact that the CAOs themselves had no transport. All units were anxious to acquire civilian vehicles and no provision was made to supply petrol for urgent civilian requirements. In the course of the final year of the Italian campaign these problems were met, but the quantity and quality of civilian transport remained poor. In the first few months Italian and German army trucks, hearses, fire engines and ox carts were all pressed into service.

i. During the winter of 1943-44 the main weight of trucking for Army AMG was carried by Army transport platoons and by Italian transport companies with Allied cadres attached to AMG and operating Allied WD vehicles. Their chief tasks were clearance of supplies from railheads, deliveries from advanced base depots to provincial supply points, assistance to Provincial Officers and CAOs, carriage of fuel, bridge-building materials, grain, etc. Although there were many instances of good work under dangerous conditions, the divided control over the personnel interfered with efficiency. The static period which preceded the break-through into the Po Valley gave the provinces in the Army areas time to build up pools of civilian trucks (Autotrasporti) which took some of the burden off transport companies. At all times, both Corps and Divisions were generous in static periods in lending trucks for moving rubble, refugees, hospital equipment, and firewood.

## ***Section 8. Local Government***

a. The lowest level at which the Italian Government is represented is the Commune (municipality), and the affairs of the Commune, which is usually composed of a number of frazione (fractions) are controlled from the Town Hall (municipio) by the Sindaco (mayor). The Sindaco's post is an honorary one and so is that of the vice-sindaco. The communal Secretary, paid on a scale corresponding to the grade of the Commune, is the Sindaco's executive official, controlling the various public services.

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Law and order are maintained by the head of the Carabinieri (CCRR), who may be anything from a Captain to a Sergeant. The Sindaco is directly responsible to the Prefect of the Province and is sometimes called a "Commissario Prefettizio". In normal times the Sindaco is advised by a Communal Council of prominent citizens. The Fascist party organization formerly had considerable influence in communal administration, but unless the commune was a large one most minor officials paid little attention to politics. Minor civil servants and communal officials were generally poorly paid. This system of administration was maintained almost unchanged by AMG. The main difference was that the Communal Council was temporarily replaced by a Giunta Municipale, composed of representatives of the different political parties interested in restoring

the life of the town. It was always AMG policy to govern through the Sindaco. In Sicily and Southern Italy, the CAO was often forced by circumstances to be almost a Governor.

b. With the advance into Central Italy the first Committees of Liberation were encountered, and, while the CAO reserved the right to appoint or dismiss Sindaci or other officials, in most cases the choice of the Committee was respected. During periods of rapid advance, many communes received only fleeting visits from CAOs and some were never visited at all.

c. The policy prior to the occupation of Northern Italy in the spring of 1945 was to dissolve the Committee of Liberation as soon as possible and form a Giunta Municipale, chosen, pending the holding of elections, to represent the various political faiths and extraneous to the actual administration of the commune. The Giunta was, in effect, the Committee of Liberation under a new name. In the fractions, similar organizations were set up on a small scale under the name "Giunta Popolare".

d. The policy was that as soon as possible civil administration should be carried on through normal Italian channels and the CAO should be free from detailed administration.

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But the principle, established in Sicily, that he should be accessible to any civilian during certain hours of the day, was never abandoned.

e. AMG landed in Sicily with the destruction of the Fascist system in Italy as one of its principal objects. But there were many snags. CAOs soon found out that their chief civilian officials had Fascist backgrounds. If no other suitable candidates were forthcoming, he informed the Security people that the continued services of those individuals was necessary to keep the commune running and to maintain law and order, and unless the man was blacklisted there was seldom any objection. If men worked hard and seemed anxious to collaborate in rebuilding the commune and restoring more normal conditions, they were generally kept on. The work of removing Fascists was a Security responsibility, though the CAO sometimes sought the advice of untainted leading citizens. The result of all this was that in the first few months AMG gained the reputation of maintaining Fascists in office and perpetuating the old system. As Southern Italy was left behind the task of finding literate anti-Fascists with some administrative experience became easier, and a list was drafted of categories of officials to be immediately arrested or deposed. Perhaps the most helpful step was the adoption of an Expuration Policy by the Italian Government. News of this had a salutary influence on Fascist racketeers who might otherwise have tried to hoodwink the CAO into letting them continue in profitable jobs. About the same time Scheda Personale (political questionnaires) were prepared and handing for filling in by Sindaci, Vice-Sindaci, Communal Secretaries and Postmasters, and later by the Province to Provincial officials. They were a guide to appropriate action. The existence of Committees of Liberation and of Partisans prevented the likelihood of prominent Fascists remaining in office. The Partisans had their own methods of expuration which were generally put into effect before AMG took over.

f. The Prefect is the Provincial representative of the Italian State and as such he was more the concern of the Provincial Commissioner than of Army AMG.

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But as Army and Region AMG organizations drew together, the importance of the Prefect as an administrative official in Army areas increased, since the implementation of provincial orders and Italian Government decrees was enforced at an earlier stage. Under AMG, the Prefect generally had to take a back seat, but his presence served to remind his subordinates that the Italian Government would one day resume its full power. There were "career" Prefects and "political" Prefects. The career Prefects were selected by the Local Government Sub-Commission of AC and sent out to newly-liberated provinces where the Fascists Prefects had invariably fled northward. But it was also possible for Provincial Commissioners to select important local figures as "political" prefects instead. It is probable in many instances the appointment of local men as Prefects was preferable. The Italian people are accustomed to the issuing of almost dictatorial decrees by their Prefects, and the Questore (Criminal Investigation Branch) and CCRR (Carabinieri) are directly under his control. The successful working of the system must depend on the ability of the individuals selected as Prefects.

g. The Committee of National Liberation (CLN) was part of a national anti-Fascist movement begun in July 1943 when all anti-Fascist parties joined to form the National Front of Liberation. It became a National Committee, 8 September 1943. Its main tasks were to combat the remaining elements of Fascism and to incite the citizens to resist the Nazis either actively or passively. But the war did not take the turn they expected, and Italy, instead of falling quickly, became divided into Enemy and Allied Occupied Territory. No CLN as such was encountered by AMG before the summer of 1944, though sometimes Giuntas, with much the same objects, were found or formed. In the more urban parts of Italy many intelligent and public-spirited CLNs were encountered. The main difficulty was when the CLN was not fully representative of all parties. In view of the weakness of the more legitimate forces of law and order, it was perhaps inevitable that the CLN should have carried on a certain amount of "unfinished business".

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Prominent Fascists "disappeared", materiel was "requisitioned" and "voluntary contributions" were imposed. Before the arrival of the Allies, Partisans "borrowed" money and food to maintain themselves, and it was not surprising that the repayment of those "loans" was sometimes unorthodox. Considerable tact was needed in dealing with those problems.

h. Public meetings in Army areas were banned by Proclamation and parties were not allowed to publish or distribute notices. Nevertheless the CAO, on entering a town, generally found manifestos of every size and color pasted up and often clandestine newspapers on the streets. The calming down of high feelings, suppressed for a quarter of a century, often required great tact. The local groups recognized by the Italian Government were the Liberals, Christian Democrats, Socialists, Republicans, Communists and the Action Party. They were generally allowed to maintain offices. The Communists were the best organized. The Italians' love of talk and mystery made the formation of numerous small political groups inevitable. There were in fact dozens of unofficial little parties. The spreading of political propaganda was difficult in view of the lack of communications and many Italians were vague about the doctrines of the political groups to which they belonged.

i. AMG policy was to cooperate as closely as possible with the Church and to spare Church property from occupation by troops. The clergy were asked to help on welfare committees and with evacuees. Announcements of AMG policy on curfew, black markets and similar subjects were frequently made from the pulpit. But the clergy did not play a part in AMG life commensurate with the importance of

the Church in Italy. Priests rarely visited the CAOs unless they wanted favors. This does not mean that they did not do their duty, but rather that they considered themselves to be representatives of the Vatican, a neutral state, and of the Catholic Church, an international body. They had to be good diplomats and they did not care to involve themselves too closely with any temporary government, whether it was German or Allied.

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There were many instances of heroism and sacrifice by the clergy and of valuable and unselfish assistance to the sick, to children and to refugees. Monks and nuns, in particular, were of invaluable aid in hospitals and refugee centers.

## **Section 9. Agriculture**

a. Until AMG and Regions worked together under unified command, the reactivation of agriculture in Army areas depended entirely of the farmers' own efforts and the keenness of Agriculture Committees formed to advise the CAO. The CAO's share was usually limited to issuing permits of various kinds.

b. When Regional Agricultural Officers arrived, it was found possible to restore agriculture in Army areas to an unprecedented extent. There were many grave difficulties. War does untold damage to farms, roads, bridges, barns, houses, etc. The enemy invariably removed livestock, transport and machinery and left thousands of buried mines in the fields, orchards and roads. Two factors were particularly helpful in the Italian campaign: (1) the *contadino's* tenacity in carrying on under the greatest difficulties and even under fire, and (2) the sympathy and help of all the branches of the Armies which made possible the preservation of livestock and allowed farmers to go on working in all except the very forward areas.

c. The agricultural problem was twofold: (1) to save all possible foodstuffs from the old harvest, and (2) to plan and execute a planting program for the next one. The success of the program was dependent upon the ability of the farmer to get his work done, the provision of seed and fertilizers, the publicizing of the program, and the willingness of the farmer to cooperate. To meet the shortage of tractors and oxen, "Help-your-neighbor" policies were instituted, in some places by decree, in others by good-will. Machine shops were set up to repair tractors, fuel was obtained through normal channels, and screening and coupon systems were set up by the Agricultural Inspectorates.

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Seed requirements were surveyed, seed was selected and cleaned, and in the sowing season of 1945 no ground remained idle for lack of seed. Fertilizer was issued for the priority crops (wheat and vegetables), and a specialized consignment for hemp was brought up. The program was publicized by PWB and the farmers were found anxious to carry it out when they understood it.

d. The formation of schools to teach mine-clearing was late getting started, but they operated successfully in the spring of 1945. Mine lifters were given special rations and rates of pay, and pensions for injuries received.

e. Reformation of Italian agricultural offices and departments was carried out as soon as possible under Regional and Provincial supervision. The difficulties encountered were mainly insufficiency of transport, lack of records, political unsuitability of personnel, and lack of accommodations. Efforts at reform were, in the main, successful and national policies were applied in Army areas in 1945 at a much earlier period than was hitherto thought possible or desirable.

## **Section 10. Commerce**

Trade, either internal or international, was not considered by Army AMG groups to be within their province. Commercial projects could not be planned or undertaken without consent of AC [Allied Commission]. Some attempts to encourage or to limit inter-provincial trade were made from time to time in Army areas, but the general lack of transport made stimulation difficult, and other factors impeded control. Operations depended largely on the use of military transport and were limited therefore to exchanges of surplus commodities.

## **Section 11. Finance**

a. In the early stages financial institutions were always closed to prevent runs on them. Large sums of money were given to CAOs to finance institutions in urgent need and to re-establish some semblance of normal conditions.

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But few CAO's were experienced in either finance or accounting and eventually AMG Finance Officers were attached to Army and later to Corps AMG.

b. The original system of advancing Allied Military Lire from town to town as the Allies moved on increased cash in circulation and helped inflation. Funds had to be replenished constantly from AFA (Allied Financial Authority) sources. During rapid advances both time and cash were often lost. Ultimately the method was changed as follows. The Finance Officer continued to advance cash as needed, but on reaching a Provincial capital he met with approved civilian finance and Treasury officials and all advances made to Provinces were integrated within the Italian fiscal system. The monies advanced were then reimbursed from Italian State funds and the receipts handed over to the Italian fiscal authorities. The results of this change were that (1) the amounts of AM Lire put out by Finance officers became almost nil, (2) advances to communal, provincial, and statal bodies were on a more or less normal basis, (3) control of expenditures was facilitated because all Italian facilities and personnel were put to work, (4) the Financial Officer no longer needed to carry large cash reserves since his fund had become a revolving one, and (5) demands on AFA funds became unnecessary.

c. Fighting units often occupied bank premises in the early days of the Italian campaign, sometimes after the operational need had ended. This practice was stopped under AAI instructions, and AMG was then able to count on having the use of banks at an early date.

d. A standard drill for re-opening banks was developed. On his initial visit to a town, the Corps Finance Officer invariably called together the bank directors, and inquired into the cash position, the

conditions of bank premises, the adequacy of the bank staff, and the names of all Bank Directors, for submission to the Security people. The date upon which the banks were to re-open were determined by his findings. Experience showed that all banks in a community must be reopened at the same time.

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When one or two banks lacked the funds to re-open a loan was arranged between the "haves" and the "have-nots". Undesirable directors were replaced by vice-directors or other competent officials of the same bank. In the latter part of the campaign banks were usually re-opened within ten days after liberation.

e. Fascist Republican laws restricting bank withdrawals gave rise to a low cash position in most banks and to large private holdings of currency. AMG advised banks to publish the fact that withdrawals were no longer limited and in almost every case cash flowed back.

f. By General Order, posted by the CAO on entering any commune, the continued payment on national, provincial and municipal taxes was ordered, and banks were authorized by Proclamation to permit withdrawals from accounts for payment of taxes. Collection of taxes during the early phases of Military Government was difficult. In many communities tax rolls had been destroyed. In the more primitive parts of Italy the villagers took the overthrow of Fascism to mean that taxes were also abolished. In some communes banks were the tax collectors, and sometimes these banks were not re-opened for some weeks or months. Sometimes troops occupied tax offices and used them for indefinite periods. Tax adjustment on land or on destroyed or damaged houses was also extremely difficult.

g. Italian post offices acted as paying agencies to the various ministries for state pensions, primary school teachers' salaries, social insurance grants and military subsidies. They also paid the public debt coupons and interest on nominal [?national?] bonds. There were post office current and savings accounts. It was therefore necessary to re-activate post offices at the earliest possible date. Military subsidy rolls were checked, forms for pensions and salaries were inspected, and authority was given to re-open for those purposes. If necessary, cash was advanced. The early resumption of payments on coupons, bond interest and current and savings accounts was not practicable, however, because of the breakdown of the postal service proper.

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h. During the first stages of occupation delays occurred in the payment of salaries and pensions owing to the disorganization of communications and paying agencies, destruction of records, dispersal of office staffs, and the flight of the recipients. In the early days of the campaign it was the practice to give relief through the commune rather than to pay military subsidies, but it was soon realized that the subsidies formed such an integral part of the Italian financial structure that their payment had to be resumed.

i. Difficulties arose out of decrees published by the Fascist Republican Government authorizing payment of salaries in advance deductible over a long number of years, bonuses, and increases in salary scales.

j. Payment of salaries to officials suspected of Fascist sympathies, arrears of salaries prior to Allied occupation and salaries of refugees without proper documents were not considered AMG responsibilities in the initial phase of operations. Pending settlement at later stages, assistance to persons

in these categories was given, in cases of urgent need, out of Ente Comunale di Assistenza (ECA) funds, administered by the communes.

## **Section 12. Food**

a. Importation of foodstuffs, transfers of food stocks from territories long liberated to other parts, and the fixing of ration scales were matters for AC action. However, Army AMGs had many food problems in their areas and considerable experience in meeting them was acquired. The theory that laws of supply and demand would settle the problems of food, food distribution, and food prices had been abandoned at an early stage.

b. Supervision of amassing of grain and olive oil was a Provincial rather than an Army AMG responsibility. The Fascist amassing procedure and machinery were largely continued by the AC, though the word "Amasso" was dropped for "Granai del Popolo" under pressure from the Public Relations Branch. [p. 559]

In areas where inflation had already begun and where there was no surplus of the commodity to be amassed, CAOs were often compelled to take strong action to prevent essential foodstuffs from being hoarded or disposed of on the black market. Coordination of Army AMG and Regional organizations helped Army AMG to meet some of the problems of civilian feeding. The main difficulties found were (1) grain was sometimes wet and unfit for storage, (2) many stores were roofless or ruined, (3) numbers of stores were occupied by troops, particularly in static periods, (4) farmers were restricted from moving grain by travel limits in operational zones, (5) Italian agencies were often reformed with difficulty, and (6) Partisans had advised people not to bring in their grain for fear the enemy would confiscate it (a fear seldom realized).

c. A partial solution was found in the rural areas by moving the grain by ox-cart to the nearest "Granai del Popolo" within the three-kilometer limit and then transporting it to large silos in the town, by AMG or Autotrasporti trucks. All grain offered for sale was bought as quickly as possible, and stored on the farms themselves if necessary. Teams were sent out at the earliest possible date to check all grain before the farmer had time to hide it and say the Germans had carried it off.

d. Naval regulations restricted fishing off the Italian coasts, sometimes for months on end, but in many instances, when considerations of security permitted, fishing fleets operated even under shell fire. Equipment was generally in poor condition and the enemy did his best to destroy the boats. The catch was seldom enough to feed the commune and there was a tendency to sell the fish at high prices in quiet corners. Zoning schemes were tried to arrange distribution on a limited but fair basis. The Army sometimes supplied fishermen with fuel and oil in exchange for a proportion of the catch.

e. Price fixing was a difficult problem, though control of various kinds were enforced throughout the campaign. Early efforts to freeze all prices at pre-invasion levels failed completely, and the final aim was to control only necessities and imported goods.

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Maximum price schedules for foodstuffs were published periodically by Army AMG headquarters, and within these ceilings provinces fixed their own maximum prices. CAOs, also, were responsible for fixing prices in



their communes. It was found that even a faulty system was better than no control. Restriction on movement interfered with black market operations, though many evaded the laws and obtained high prices from clandestine meetings. It was found impossible to maintain low prices in areas adjacent to those in which prices were unchecked.

f. Ration scales were fixed by HQ AC but were often an unattainable ideal. Two important items in all scales, pasta and oil, were always difficult to provide. It was sometimes necessary to hoard supplies in areas where there was a great demand in order to meet future commitments, but that policy inevitably led to discontent among the civilians who had to go short. Various ration scales were introduced for different classes such as heavy workers, hospital patients, prisoners, certain categories of refugees and forest guards. Particular attention was given to the distribution of special rations for heavy workers, since the Army was directly interested. It was our policy to make communes responsible for the enforcement of ration scales.

### ***Section 13. Industry***

a. In the general interest of the war effort, important war materials were brought under control as rapidly as possible and factories which could be repaired and set to work were protected against unnecessary damage. However, in order to provide hard standings for military vehicles plants were almost inevitably occupied for varying periods and considerable damage was done to stocks. Small stocks of important materials not declared by the owners were often removed by persons unknown, both soldiers and civilians. Adequate protection was very difficult.

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b. To try to protect essential war materials General Orders were produced, warning units of their responsibilities in the proper use of such materials and ordering all manufacturers to declare to AMG the condition of their premises and details of their stocks.

c. The activation of industry depended on fuel, which was controlled by the Armies, and so immediate production could be resumed only when the Armies were interested in the product. CAOs were responsible for forwarding details of industrial premises through channels to HQ AC, and industrial experts from Region or AC HQ were often of great assistance in the early stages of protecting industrial establishments from unnecessary damage.

d. For several months AMG depended on its gasoline, oil and lubricants on what could be secured from Armies by private arrangement, on what had been hoarded by civilians, and on finds of German and Italian dumps, until the latter came under control of DDST. During most of the last year of the campaign, these fuel items were drawn for communes by the CAO through Army channels, the Corps AMG LO [Liaison Officer] being responsible for the accounting. But shortly before the opening of the 1945 Spring campaign an Italian civilian organization (CIP) was set up in each province and made responsible for the handling of gasoline drawn from the Army. The CAO's responsibility was to make the initial bid and to ensure proper use. Fuel was released to civilians for milling and for vehicles, especially ambulances. Requests for kerosene were usually ignored except from hospitals. In the summer of 1944 lubricants and

fuel needed for threshing arrived late, owing to a shortage of transport, but comparatively little of the harvest was lost.

e. Until the Po Valley was entered, electric power was usually non-existent. In the large towns it was always controlled by the Armies on a priority basis. Coal was unobtainable because it could not be hauled and small local stocks were usually required by Armies. The supply of wood fuel and charcoal was organized by AMG and controlled so as not to denude Italy of its timber reserves. There was never any serious lack of liquid fuel drawn from Army sources, but all solid fuels were in short supply at all times.

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f. The problem of requisitioning was never really solved in operational areas. In emergencies, units always made use of any materials needed for the immediate prosecution of the war, such as bricks, timber, coal, pipes and glass. Time and correct forms were rarely available to complete a transaction between a unit and an owner, and often the owner was absent. Until 1945, AMG was regarded as the authority for allotment of essential materials and many units thought a chit to the owner was enough. Army instructions on requisitioning ultimately cleared up the situation somewhat.

g. Blocking was resorted to in order to control materials essential to both the military and civilians, and to keep them out of the black market. An experiment in control was made in 1944 but was not followed up. Later a representative from the Local Resources Branch of AAI was attached to Army, but relations between him and AMG were never very close. Instructions on blocking were issued to CAOs in July 1944 but were enforced reluctantly. Later instructions shifted some of the responsibility to G-4 at Corps and Army, and stores of essential material were blocked on behalf of the Army and in the name of the Commanding General. Unfortunately the Army never had the personnel needed to protect all dumps of essential materials. Finally, just before the break-through into Northern Italy, a General Order was drafted, defining essential materials and requiring their immediate declaration on pain of severe penalty. Investigations were to be made by Italian officials appointed by CAOs.

## **Section 14. Labor**

a. The provision of labor to the armed forces was always an important part of the CAO's work. Regulations were scantily issued at first by higher formations any pay varied from a mid-day meal to a chit marked "AMG will pay". But from 1944 on, both AFHQ and AMG issued detailed regulations for the employment of civilians.

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b. In most of the larger towns Civil Labor Offices were set up, and in the winter of 1944-45, after the services of Regional Labor Officers became available, much was done to place civilian labor directly employed by Armies, working on Army contracts, or privately employed, on a sounder basis than ever before contemplated. Cost of Living Bonuses, Social Security Grants, and Family Allowances were all introduced in Army areas.

c. Difficulties were encountered especially in the early days. Labor was urgently need by the Armies for road building, and as waiters, cooks, and interpreters. Civilians were generally not anxious to work immediately, and, while strong action was sometimes taken by CAOs to procure labor, the policy was to avoid methods which resembled those of the Todt Organization. Once the labor unions got into operation, civilian labor was generally enrolled in sufficient volume, though in some agricultural communities there were difficulties. Civilians were usually glad to work for the Armies and often did so at considerable personal risk. Lack of boots and clothing required by the laborers was always a problem, especially in the winter.

d. The "Camera del Lavoro" was not allowed to function legally in Army areas, but worked underground. The authorized labor organization was the "Ufficio Provinciale del Lavoro" operating under the AMG Labor Officer who, with his division, was concerned with the application of the labor policies of the Allied Commission and the Italian Government in so far as such application was feasible in Army areas. Orders abolishing the Fascist labor system were always issued immediately, and Regional, Provincial and Communal Labor Offices, staffed by Italian civilians, were set up to replace it. Their field included registration and recruiting of workers, industrial relations and labor statistics, for the Allied forces as well as for civilian employment.

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e. Labor unions were allowed to engage in collective bargaining in private industry even in Army areas, but they were not allowed to hold meetings or demonstrations until the Armies moved forward.

f. Social security agencies were started as soon as possible, in conjunction with the Finance Divisions, for the provision of assistance in old age, sickness, injury and unemployment for workers in either military or civilian employ.

## **Section 15.        *Public Works and Utilities***

a. During rapid advances the initiation of public works was usually left to Provincial and Regional Officers, but with the amalgamation of Army and Provincial AMG it was possible to accomplish a great deal of reconstruction. In large towns Army engineers assumed responsibility for carrying out emergency repairs to public services with the help of the Genio Civile. Waterworks and drainage were priority projects. Other emergency work depended on the amount of materiels required by the Army for its own use. Army engineers were sometimes hasty in requisitioning tools and building materiels, but their assistance to AMG with advice and transport always outweighed any minor differences on that score. The Army often supplied water trucks and static tanks for the relief of urban civilians. Fortunately, in Italy, most communes were well supplied with wells and the sewage systems were generally primitive, otherwise the enemy's systematic destruction of pumps and aqueducts would have been far more serious than it was.

b. In communes outside the L of C, the Genio Civile was responsible for emergency repairs. The Italian government subsidized emergency housing repairs up to 10,000 lire. CAOs were responsible for advising municipal officials of the procedure to be followed. Estimates for long-term projects in Italy were difficult to make because prices rose so quickly.

c. With the energetic cooperation of Army engineers, the Consorzio Bonifica and the Genio Civile, flood control was carried on in areas deliberately inundated by the Germans, and much flooded land was restored to cultivation in the spring of 1945.

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d. As early as October 1943, in Eighth Army, AMG Roads Officers were appointed to effect liaison between military and civil engineers for the reconstruction of roads and bridges. During the first winter they were responsible for the registration, payment and furnishing of supplementary ration cards to the workers. Those tasks were taken over in 1944-45 by the Civil Labor Offices and the Engineers. The main concern of the Roads Officers was to repair and rebuild the main military highways, but work was also done on side roads and bridges to enable civilian life to carry on. The great calls on Bailey bridging as the Armies advanced made the early reconstruction of permanent bridges extremely important. Labor problems involved food, clothing, transport, and the agricultural season. Except in very rare cases the road and bridge workers were not fed by the Army, but received a supplement of 200 grammes of bread a day. Some reconditioned boots were made available. Roadside labor, which could walk to and from the job, was preferred, but for large projects WD transport had to be used. Town labor was called upon for road work during the harvesting seasons of June and July. Uniformity of wages and their stabilization in adjacent areas was found essential; the level of the wage scale was less important than its uniformity. Materiel and transport were provided by the Armies, but full use was made of local resources. Contracts for bridge building were arranged by the Roads Officers and were framed to induce the contractor to bring out hidden timber, brick, lime, cement, and machinery. Reactivation of brickworks was another responsibility of the Roads Officers in conjunction with Army Engineers.

e. Perhaps no industry in Italy was as hard hit by war as the electric power industry south of the Po Valley. It was singled out for destruction by the retreating enemy, the Allied bomber, and the partisan saboteur. That meant the paralysis of all industry, electrically operated mills and water systems.

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Army assumed responsibility for reconstruction and for priorities in Army areas, and were very sympathetic in allotting current for essential civilian installations such as hospitals and mills.

## **Section 16.        *Shipping***

Seagoing and coastwise shipping did not come within the scope of AMG activities in Army areas. Any use made of them for the movement of supplies or refugees was made through AC or military or naval authorities.

## **Section 17.        *Transportation***

a. Reactivation of railways tramways, and other transport systems on a large scale was primarily an AC responsibility, but in Army areas every effort was made to restore local traffic as rapidly as possible. Civilians were discouraged from using their decrepit vehicles on the chief military roads, but civilian engineers were given help to rebuild the minor roads and bridges.

b. Railways were a state monopoly and were invariably wrecked by the retreating enemy or by Allied bombing. Single line railways were built along the main routes under military supervision. Civilians were not permitted to travel on them, but they were used to back-load refugees and to bring up AMG civilian supplies.

c. The autobus system was once an important public service in Italy. Occasional buses were left behind intact by the Germans, but lack of spare tires made it hard to run them. Some limited bus services were started in rear army areas for civilians.

d. With permission from CMP, civilians were allowed to travel in WD transport, and AMG depended on this concession for the transportation of its civilian officials.

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## ***Section 18. Communication***

Telephone, telegraph, radio and postal services were all strictly controlled by Armies until they were handed over to the AC. The lack of postal facilities hit civilians hardest, and a considerable volume of mail was carried illegally in spite of severe penalties imposed by AMG. The lack of communications facilitated the rise of rumors among civilians and AMG tried to control them with the help of the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) which had highly mobile units with each Army and worked closely with AMG on local questions of public information. The complete collapse of civilian communications was one of the greatest handicaps to efficient civil administration.

## ***Section 19. Displaced Persons and Repatriation***

a. There was a Refugee Branch in each Army AMG to deal with refugees and refugee problems in Army areas, including their reception in camps, provision of accommodations, and evacuation to AC camps and holding centers. Italian refugees from the South, and Allied Nationals (except escaped Allied Prisoners of War) were handled through these departments. Local refugees were dispersed in neighboring communes or held in camps. The early practice of evacuating refugees right out of Army areas was discontinued, partly because transportation to and accommodation in the South were severely limited, and partly because splitting up families caused greater hardship.

b. The organization consisted of : (1) forward refugee camps normally attached to Corps, (2) second line refugee camps, under Area control, operating as part of Army Roadhead, and (3) the office of the Senior Refugee Officer at Rear Army HQ. The Red Cross provided a representative responsible for administration of Italian Red Cross personnel and for distribution of clothing and other comforts. Each camp was commanded by an Allied officer, assisted by a Senior Italian Officer, one or more junior Italian officers, two or more Italian Red Cross Sisters, an Italian Medical Officer, an Italian chaplain and the necessary number of Italian NCOs and soldiers.

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Carabinieri were provided to keep order and G-2 had a security representative attached.

c. Reception, maintenance and evacuation of refugees were finally regularized as follows: Evacuation from forward camps was through back-loading divisional or corps transport. On entering camp all refugees were registered, "vetted", disinfected and given any necessary medical care. Evacuation to second-line camps was through returning Corps or Army transport. Refugees have been regarded, since the 1940 French in France, as an Army problem, and AMG never experienced any difficulty in securing army transport to move them. The evacuation and holding camps allowed AMG to keep roads and areas clear of refugees during advances.

d. Experience showed that the majority of Italian civilians were very reluctant to evacuate themselves or to be evacuated by AMG. Their ability to "double up" in nearby areas when they were evacuated from combat zones was at first under-estimated.

## **Section 20.        *Education***

a. Until the winter of 1944-45 it was not thought practicable to open schools in Army areas, but this was finally done with good results in the rear zones. Further forward, with travel strictly held down and troops in occupation of buildings, the schools remained closed. The opening of schools served two purposes: (1) it helped keep children off the streets and away from troops, and (2) it enabled AMG to do away with Fascist school officials during the period of Allied occupation and to substitute able professional leadership.

b. The Provincial and Regional Education Officers decided the date when schools might re-open and notified the Provveditore agli Studii who was an AMG appointee. As soon as the Bank of Italy re-opened, teachers were paid through the Provveditore.

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Heads of schools were required to file a Scheda Personale with the Provveditore and those with unsuitable political backgrounds were suspended. Revised text books and school supplies were brought forward through AC channels, and directives for the approval, sale, price and confiscation of books were issued to book-sellers through the Provincial Prefects. Enforcement was a responsibility of the Communal Sindaci, who were also responsible for school buildings and for providing school lunches. When all the school buildings were occupied by troops, lessons were given in private homes, and religious institutions continued to educate homeless and orphaned children.

## **Section 21.        *Legal Affairs***

a. Allied Military Government was based on Proclamations and General Orders, and the CAO [Civil Affairs Officer] was the representative of the Commanding General in enforcing them. Posting of the Proclamations was the CAO's first official act on entering a commune. In the earlier days Proclamations were numerous and often hard to obtain; some were inappropriate, and not infrequently notices closing and re-opening banks were posted simultaneously. Proclamations and General Orders were quickly removed by weather, passing traffic and children, or covered over with new orders, and CAOs usually forgot when and where they had been posted. To prevent confusion, copies of all Proclamations were later signed, dated

and left with the Commune and the Carabinieri, and the Provincial Legal Officer was informed of the dates and particulars of posting. Local notices and announcements were usually signed by Italian officials with AMG approval, though for publication of an order which was not an extension of the Proclamations, consent from higher authority was needed. In the last year of the campaign, Provincial Orders and some decrees of the Italian Government were posted in Army areas, but normally implementation of Italian law did not occur until provinces passed under Regional control.

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b. Having posted Proclamations, the CAO was empowered to establish summary courts to try violations of them. At first many CAOs were nervous of legal forms and procedures and preferred the Police Officers to hold court. But simplification of procedures and documentation made the work easier. The great majority of CAOs were fully capable of holding Summary Courts and giving the accused the impression that he was getting a fair deal. All Summary Court sentences were reviewed by the Senior Legal Officer and sentences were sometimes quashed. Suggestions that scales of punishment should be published were never carried out. Penalties sometimes varied considerably in adjacent communes, but it was felt more satisfactory to leave decisions to the judgement of the individual CAO. Errors on the side of severity were not discouraged as sentences could always be reduced but not increased. Italians were used to heavy punishments from their own courts. With gradual inflation fines became less and less of a penalty, but most Italians regarded prison terms as deterrents. The majority of Summary Court cases were for violations of curfew and travel restrictions. Possession of Allied property was another violation often difficult to judge. Black market cases were generally referred to civil courts. Considerable variations were found in the application of the suspended sentence, though most CAOs used it in cases of extreme youth, old age or illness. Confiscation, particularly of civilian transport, was at the option of the Provincial Commissioner. Summary Courts imposed imprisonment up to one year or 50,000 lire. In default of payment, 100 lire was taken to be the equivalent of one day's imprisonment. In the Summary Courts the CAO generally acted as judge, with the Civil Affairs Police Office (CAPO) as prosecutor. More serious cases were tried by Superior Courts, imposing sentences up to ten years and unlimited fines. These courts were conducted by Provincial Legal Officers, who were always trained lawyers. Some Italians viewed the prospect of long terms of imprisonment with equanimity, believing there would be a general amnesty when the Allies left Italy. The most serious cases were tried before General Military Courts of three or more officers, one of whom had to be a trained lawyer.

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They were appointed by the Army Commander or the SCAO. Spies and saboteurs arrested in Army areas were tried by AMG General Military Courts convened in the Army areas, with regularly assigned Prosecutors and Defending Officers.

c. Italian Courts were always reactivated as soon as possible. In Sicily large numbers of cases and prisoners were found untried, and some civil cases dating from the Messina earthquake were still outstanding. Several difficulties were encountered in reopening the Civilian Courts: officials sometimes fled to enemy occupied territory, court premises and records were often destroyed. But it was not uncommon for the first court session to be held within three weeks of the occupation of a Province. From 1944 onwards AMG began to allow Italian courts in rear of Corps boundaries to try minor violations of Allied Proclamations, such as curfew and circulation offenses. This took a burden off the CAO and served to educate Italian courts in Allied principles of justice. In primitive areas, CAOs, on the other hand, were asked to decide

cases involving offenses against Italian law, but rarely did so. Under the Fascist regime numerous cases were settled in Special Courts, and there is no doubt that even under Allied occupations many small disputes were settled by arbitration of the Giunta Popolari or Partisan bands. The reasons for this seem to have been general lack of communication, a long hiatus in which Italian courts failed to function, and the fear of reprisals engendered by twenty years of Fascism.

d. Many of the higher Italian legal officials were epurated, but most avvocati were only too anxious to cooperate with AMG and renew their practice. The legal profession was nearly always well represented in the Committees of National Liberation and the Sindaci were more often than not lawyers. Most lawyers were keen politicians as well. Shortly after the occupation of an area it was the practice to instruct lawyers to select a committee to represent them. The avvocati usually took pride in defending their clients in AMG Summary Courts and were not afraid to make the best of their legal knowledge, which was usually superior to that of the CAO.

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## **Section 22.        *Monuments, Fine Arts and Monuments***

a. For some time no Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives (MFAA) Officer was attached to AMG at Army level, and apart from endeavoring to prevent misuse of churches and other historic buildings by troops, the CAO had no responsibility in this respect. With the attachment of a Specialist MFAA Officer in 1944, the preparation of a list of protected monuments, and notices to designate them, increased the possibility of guarding against damage. Protection was needed against vandalism by troops and civilians, carelessness arising from ignorance of values, and continued injury from weather to damaged structures.

b. Buildings were considered worthy of protection because of (1) inherent architectural merit, (2) valuable and/or perishable contents, or (3) historical associations. Bridges, fountains, memorials and arches were also important. Later on, attempts were made to preserve parks and ornamental trees and plants. During operations, museums, libraries and archives are especially susceptible to damage. MFAA Officers kept close contact with units and Town Majors to prevent as much damage as possible.

c. On entering a town the CAO posted a notice on each known important monument or church, identifying it and prohibiting removal of damaged or undamaged materials. He then asked the Town Major to place off limits, for the time being, all museums, galleries and libraries. Finally, he warned unit commanders in occupation of protected buildings of their responsibility. Custodians were provided for many edifices and valuable objects were removed for safe storage.

d. Emergency repairs most needed in the early stages were: (1) recovery and storage of fragments of stone and other decorative elements from debris, (2) emergency bracing of weakened structures, (3) protection of external ornaments against traffic damage and (4) temporary repairs of leaking roofs above perishable materials like frescoes, mosaics, books, and manuscripts.

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Simple first-aid repairs, if done early, were found better economy than delayed major projects. Such emergency measures were generally authorized by the MFAA Officer with the appropriate civilian authorities, with any necessary pressure applied by the CAO.

## **Section 23. Partisans**

a. The story of the Italian partisans may never be more than half told. Every day of the campaign in Central and Northern Italy revealed new tales of German atrocity and partisan bravery.

b. Until the Spring offensive of 1944, partisans were usually encountered in the form of scattered individuals who performed great services to the Allies as guides to patrols in mountainous areas. There were also, however, small bands of partisans whose one aim was generally to free their own commune. They were not part of a central organization. AMG recognized that these men, employed directly or indirectly by the army, had certain rights of movement and weapon carrying.

c. During the advance toward Pisa, Florence and the Gothic Line, the first organized bands and units of the Garibaldi Brigade were met, as well as other bands composed and/or led by Yugoslavs, Russians and even British and American ex-Prisoners-of-War. These Italians were reluctant to give up their arms to the CCRR (Carabinieri) or the Italian Army, and Allied partisans were unwilling to surrender them to anybody. Finally it was agreed that arms should be handed in for safe-keeping to the CAO who would reissue them in case of necessity, or see that they were dropped further north in enemy-occupied territory. At this time the partisans were often the only armed body between the CAO and the Germans. The principle was adopted of making the band leader responsible for the handing in of arms and for the conduct of his men, as well as for the preparation of lists of bone fide Partisans. The issue of diplomas for valour, signed by the Supreme Allied Commander, was a natural sequel to this policy.

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The working of the system depended on the individual leader. Bands of partisans varied from local lads who joined up after the Germans withdrew and were not adverse to campaigning against landowners, all the way to well-armed, disciplined and centrally controlled units like the Garibaldi brigade.

d. To assist the CAO, Italian "Patriot" Officers were attached to each Corps, and for a time representatives of the Central CLN were also attached. Partisans of Allied nationalities were generally sent to camps in Southern Italy in transit to their own country.

e. AMG found it difficult to fulfil many promises made by radio to the Partisans as no adequate supplies of clothing or food were available. There was some disillusionment and political influences came into play. However, welfare committees were formed, and two members of the Giunta Municipale were appointed to find work for ex-Partisans and to help them either through ECA [Ente Comunale di Assistenza] or with voluntary gifts. After this first aid treatment higher representatives came to arrange for pensions or other gratuities. During the winter of 1944-45 large rest and rehabilitation centers were set up where demobilized Partisans could obtain free food and lodging for a month while looking for work. Clothing was provided from Rome. A form of Identity Card certifying that the bearer had been a Partisan was issued. In the Army area, the Partisan and his welfare in the emergency stage was primarily an AMG responsibility.

## **Section 24.        *Public Health and Welfare***

a.        The Army was greatly concerned with the success or failure of the Public Health and Welfare Branch of AMG. A disease-free population in an Army area is a protection to the health of the troops. There were no epidemics in areas controlled by Army AMGs, though one or two out-breaks of typhoid were classified as exaggerated endemics. The Army did not recognize medical treatment of civilians as its responsibility, but AMG Public Health Officers did their best to restore the civilian medical services and to provide needed materials.

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Civil hospitals and ambulatories were reorganized.

b.        Major problems were the numerous civilian battle casualties, occupation of civilian hospitals by the military, and lack of supplies and equipment. In 1944 Public Health Officers were attached to Corps HQs, for close liaison with the Medical Branch. Italian Army Field Hospitals were used as Casualty Clearing Stations for civilians. They were kept as far forward as possible and their patients were evacuated to civil hospitals in rear areas. For many months AMG depended almost wholly on the Army for ambulances, but ultimately Ambulance Platoons were formed for AMG use. During static periods the American Field Service was generous in loaning ambulances to AMG.

c.        Control, diagnosis and treatment of women suffering from venereal disease received special attention. Italian civilian facilities were inadequate and unreliable and AMG organized its own mobile VD hospitals staffed by civilians.

d.        In the early days of our occupation, medical supplies were scarce and had to be begged from Army sources, or collected from abandoned German or Italian stocks or from wrecked pharmacies. Public Health Branch of AMG ultimately transported its own stocks and made issues from mobile Medical Supply Depots in the form of "Spearhead Kits" (carried by CAOs), hospital kits, and bulk supplies. The sale of drugs through normal civilian channels was resumed as soon as possible. Fixing of prices and distribution of Medical supplies through wholesalers and pharmacies was started in Army areas long before it was tried elsewhere in Italy, but it did not work well owing to lack of communications and to other similar factors.

e.        Lunatics were a problem as asylums were few and generally full. Diseases most frequently met were: typhoid, diphtheria, scabies, and malaria. There were some "typhus" scares caused by the similarity of the Italian names for Typhoid and Typhus.

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f.        The low standard of medical services in Italy was a constant surprise to AMG. Many civilians preferred Army doctors and dressing stations to their own civilian equivalents. Close supervision of hospital authorities and communal doctors was always necessary.

g. Reorganization of private and public welfare institutions and agencies began in Army areas. ECA [Ente Comunale di Assistenza] was the principal Agency providing relief in cash or kind. It generally had to be reorganized and new officials appointed. In some instances ECA organized communal feeding. Provincial and Communal Refugee Committees were set up but the lack of public spirit in most Italians interfered with their efficiency. Orphanages and homes for old people were found over-crowded, ill-equipped, and partially disorganized, but attempts were made to keep them going. Re-organization of the Italian Red Cross was a priority project of AMG Public Welfare; however, transport was scarce and in poor conditions, many Fascist officials had to be removed and there was never much support from the general public.

h. In the first few weeks many families became separated and casualties were sometimes removed far from their homes. The British and American Red Cross made every effort to keep contact between the patients and their families. A fairly comprehensive survey of all communal institutions and agencies was undertaken which was of value to the Italian Welfare officials as well as to AMG.

## **Section 25. Public Safety**

a. Public safety in Army areas is closely related to the safety of the Army itself. The chief purpose of AMG was to relieve the Army of responsibility for civilian affairs and to prevent local disturbances which might hamper operations. Trained Allied policemen were attached to AMG from the start of the Italian campaign. It was originally intended to have a CAO and CAPO (Civil Affairs Police Officer) in every large town, but shortage of personnel made this impossible.

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Police officers often carried out the duties of CAOs and even of AMG LOs.

b. Large numbers of CCRR [Carabinieri] were attached to the Army to maintain public order. The Senior Civil Affairs Officer (SCAPO) at Army HQ was responsible for their clothing, administration and operations. The CCRR rendered great service to AMG. The troops recognized that they represented law and order under AMG control. Before a Province fell to the Allied forces, a nucleus of CCRR was formed to operate in it. They were fed in from base depots in Rome, Florence and Bari, and "dropped off" as communes were liberated. Each CAO had three or four mobile CCRR attached to him who followed from town to town, relieving him of many manual duties and also serving to represent the forces of law and order. CCRR personnel found in civilian clothes in any area were sent back to their base depots for screening and refitting, though it was never possible to equip them adequately. Nevertheless they could be relied upon to carry out their duties to the best of their ability.

c. The Royal Guardia di Finanza was the next most important policing force, but they never succeeded in obtaining the privileges which the Allies gave to the CCRR. Many were old soldiers and were sometimes employed as auxiliary police. They were generally used to check black market offences and as customs officials. In some cases they committed offences themselves, and generally were not as reliable as the CCRR.

d. The Pubblica Sicurezza were found in large towns and were a kind of detective force though they were frequently uniformed. They were controlled by the Questura, and usually needed more time for political decontamination than a CAO could spare.

e. Guardia Municipale, or Vigile Urbana, were controlled by the Commune. They were generally well-meaning but rarely intelligent. They were kept on point duty and used for the supervision of markets and street cleaning.

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f. Guardia Forestale were state gamekeepers. They patrolled forests to prevent thefts of wood, charcoal and game. They were neither numerous nor important.

g. The Vigile del Fuoco (Fire Brigades) generally found their equipment smashed or carried away by the Germans, They worked well with the Army Fire Services, however and proved useful.

h. UNPA, Italy's Air Raid Protection body, had a low standard of efficiency and was not very reliable in air raids. The heads were often politically unsuitable.

i. In incidents involving Italian troops and civilians, AMG reserved its right to try Italian soldiers in Military Courts. The behavior of Italian troops was generally neither better nor worse than that of other soldiers.

j. Conditions in Italian prisons were very poor, but the Italian authorities appeared satisfied with them. AMG laid down standard ration scales for prisoners, but constant vigilance was needed to see that they were supplied. In the early months troops had a tendency to throw open all prisons and release their inmates, not only anti-Fascists but often criminals.

k. Law enforcement in the early phases of an advance was seldom found to be a great problem, but it became less easy in static stages when the populace realized that it was finally free again.

l. The issue of permits to circulate beyond stipulated distances or after curfew was an onerous duty of AMG. Officers were ultimately assigned to do almost nothing else, with the assistance of G-2 personnel. Canalization of permits was found important: if more than one AMG officer issued them in a town the civilians would make the rounds of every office before giving up hope. For a long time there was no standard form of pass, but the introduction of a standard AC/AMG "Yellow Pass" decreased the tendency of officers and men of all units to issue "travel chits". AMG were at one time responsible for the issue of travel permits to the Italian Armed Forces but this proved to be impracticable.

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m. Travel was restricted with the sole object of maintaining military security and to keep the roads clear for military traffic. Limits in Army areas were normally 10 km but in Divisional areas they might be cut down to 3 km, or less. The value of these restrictions depended on the forces available to carry them out. The task fell almost entirely on AMG until the autumn of 1944 when G-2 assumed the responsibility for

maintaining road blocks. Really strict control was possible only on forward areas. AMG looked on the permit system as a necessary evil, though to some extent it help to limit black market operations.

n. Civilian motor vehicles were not allowed to circulate without AMG permits displayed on the windshield. All civilian vehicles had to be registered before they could be used, and the issue of petrol coupons depended on registration. Permits were issued to photographers to carry on their trade with certain limitations. Fishing permits were issued only with Naval approval. Permits for public assemblies, and permits to carry arms were very rarely issued in the Army areas.

## **Section 26. *Italian Armed Forces***

a. Three of the most important AC [Allied Commission] Sub-Commissions set up to deal with problems arising out of the unconditional surrender of Italy in 1943 were the Air Force, Land Force and Navy Sub-Commissions. All three were independent of the four main Sections of AC and all operated mainly on high policy levels and in close and constant co-operation with AFHQ [Allied Force Headquarters]. G-5 Section, 15th Army Group, and AMG, Fifth and Eighth Armies, were not concerned with the operations of the Air Force and Naval sub-Commissions.

b. A branch of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, known as the Military Mission to the Italian Army (MMIA), did maintain liaison officers in Fifth and Eighth Armies to supply them with Italian combat and service troops. AMG had no direct contact with MMIA, though they were both branches of AC.

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## **Section 27. *War Materiels Disposal and Prisoners of War***

a. The War Materiels Disposal and Prisoners of War Sub-Commission, HQ AC, operated directly with the G-4 and Salvage Branches of the Army in salvaging and disposing of recovered war materiels. AMG in Armies played a minor role in these operations. Some co-ordinating was done by G-5 Section, 15th Army Group.

b. G-5 Section, 15th Army Group, was somewhat more directly involved in the repatriation of Italian Prisoners of War released in Northern Italy and Germany following the break-through into the Po Valley. It acted as a supervising agency and saw that the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission representatives worked with the Armies to facilitate the movement of these people. In Army areas the Armies themselves were responsible for the handling of freed Italian Prisoners of War, but behind 15th Army Group lines they became the sole responsibility of AC. In moving them, especially in the acute stage which followed the collapse and surrender of the German Armies in Italy and south-eastern Austria, both Fifth and Eighth Armies used AMG machinery, coordinated by "Displaced Persons and Refugees" personnel, to facilitate their disposition. G-5, 15th Army Group, shipped to Southern Italy by AC transport, thousands of ex-POWs delivered into the rear sections of 15th Army Group area by Army transport.

## **Section 28. *Public Relations***

a. AMG Public Relations on 15th Army Group and Army levels was a succession of improvisations from the time the Allies landed in Italy until well into 1945. The result was that AMG never had a very good press in the Allied countries and a great deal of fine work done in forward areas never found its way into print. The Branch with which radio and press correspondents had their closest contact, and from which they were bound to judge the efficiency of the entire organization, was totally inadequate for the job to be done.

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b. Fifth Army AMG had some PR personnel, off and on, until a few weeks after the liberation of Rome, again for some days in the fall of 1944, and then again when the SCAO secured a civilian Public Relations agent from PWB [Public Welfare Branch]. Eighth AMG had no PRO [Public Relations Officer] at all until May, 1944, when one of the Deputy Directors of the Branch moved forward into the field to cover operations until after the City of Florence was handed over from AMG Eighth Army to AMG Fifth Army late in August 1944. In February 1945 a permanent PRO was assigned to AMG Eighth Army. Regions had Public Relations Divisions, some of them quite large and active, until March 1944, when they were all abolished and their staffs dispersed. While they existed they cooperated with Army AMGs.

c. In the fall of 1944 it was realized that both Army AMGs were entitled to coverage, and the Deputy Director (Field) was moved from AMG Eighth Army and attached to Civil Affairs Section, HQ AAI [Allied Armies in Italy] (later G-5 Section, 15th Army Group) to "supervise" field operations. He was, however, given no assistants to enable him to operate effectively.

d. Finally, after the Allied Armies had broken through into the Po Valley and correspondents had begun to pour northward into the newly liberated industrial areas, an AMG PRO was loaned by AC HQ to Fifth Army PR to cover North-west Italy for both Army and AMG, and an NCO was loaned temporarily to the Deputy Director (Field).

e. Experience in the Italian campaign made it clear that, failing an effective Public Relations Branch at AC/AMG headquarters with an adequate staff and facilities to cover the forward areas, AMG PROs should have been under command of Army Public Relations, using Army PR facilities and channels. Close liaison between the Army PROs covering AMG and the PWB combat teams, on questions affecting the Italian press, cinema and radio in Army areas, could have been maintained. A similar arrangement at 15th Army Group HQ would have been workable.

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[The document as presented here is - within the limits of my vision, alertness, and stamina - an accurate rendering of the original; but it is not a "true copy". Occasional misspellings and typographic errors in the

original have been corrected. Further annotations - primarily abbreviation and acronym expansions - and insertions of clearly dropped words appear in 'square brackets'.  
- Patrick Skelly, for milhist.net]

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